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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintiffRespondent,

Case No. 13879

vs.
PATRY CURTIS,
DefendantAppellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Patry Curtis, appeals conviction
of distributing a controlled substance, amphetamine,
in violation of Section 58-37-8(A)(a)(ii), Utah Code
Ann. (1953).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
the Honorable Bryant Croft, Judge, found defendant guilty
of distribution of a controlled substance for value.

The

defendant Curtis was fined the sum of $5,000 and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term
of not more than ten years.
On October 15, 19 74, one day prior to trial,
Judge Croft conducted a hearing on the issue of entrapment.

Digitized
by theevidence
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ruled that

no entrapment occurred, as a matter of law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court
affirming the verdict and judgment of the Fourth District
Court in this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In April, 1973, Rose Ann Stout was employed
by the Region Four
police agent.

Drug Task Force as an undercover

Her contact with defendant Patry Curtis

commenced in late March or early April of the next
year.
H.

Entrapment Hearing 30 hereinafter cited with an

(T.6).

Curtis was a well known figure in the Provo

area for his involvement with the criminal element.
Trial Transcript 60, hereinafter cited with a T.

Miss

Stout1s assignment was to contact him in her capacity as
a narcotics agent.

While a "friendship" developed between

them, there is no evidence that a sexual relationship
evolved.
(T.37).

Miss Stout denies such inferences emphatically
While they were together on many occasions, there

was never a showing that a romantic relationship had developed.
For example, no witness ever testifed that he observed
them holding hands, or kissing, let alone having any first
hand knowledge that there was sexual intercourse.

Miss

I

Stout wore a "bugging" device quite often, allowing other)
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members of the Task Force to monitor the conversations,
Ralph Lee Harper, director of the Region Four Drug Task
Force corroborated Miss Stout1s testimony, having listened
to many conversations between Miss Stout and Mr. Curtis
(T. 50-53, 90-99).
The particular sale of narcotics in question
was initiated on June 17, 19 74, by Mr. Curtis.

He came

to Miss Stout's home, alone, at about 3:00 p.m., and
spoke to her through the bedroom window, telling her
that he had "some more speed (amphetamines) available"
(T. 9 ) . Later that same day, he called her at the Country
Club where she worked and made arrangements to meet her
at the Rodeway Inn around 11:30 p.m.

Miss Stout tele-

phoned him later that evening, just after 11:00 p.m.,
in a taped conversation, from the Task Force Office, ordering five hundred pills

(T.8-13).

With a monitoring device attached to her person,
and supplied with $100 from the Task Force, Rose Ann
Stout made her connection with Mr. Curtis just after midnight, at the Rodeway Inn.

The defendant gave her five

small plastic sacks, containing approximately one hundred
amphetamines each, in return for one hundred dollars.

A

pre-arranged signal was given upon completion of the sale,
and defendant was arrested.

He had been under surveillance

by other members of the Drug Task Force Team (T. 14-16).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There is no evidence that defendant was coerced
into a nonvoluntary sale.

While doubting the inducing power

of a sexual relationship, respondent submits that defendant
was never involved sexually with the witness Rose Ann
Stout; and assuming such, the alleged relationship would
have terminated more than two months earlier.

As the

trial judge pointed out, it was. . .
"(n)ot a crucial point. . .(since)
he can still willingly make sales of
drugs. . . It seems rather clear to
me that whatever Mr. Curtis1 activities were by June 17th, he was perfectly willincr to make a sale to Miss Stout.11
(T. 113-115)
. ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE, WITHIN C HS DISCRETION, PROPERLY LIMITED THE QUESTIONING TO THE LIMITS ALLOWED BY
STATUTE ALLOWED BY STATUTE AND RULES OF EVIDENCE.
During both the entrapment hearing and the
trial, defense counsel repeatedly sought to show that
Rose Ann Stout's motives in joining the Task Force
and her credibility were suspect.

To do this, he offered

testimony of her alleged use of narcotic and sexual
promiscuity.
Miss Stout

These allegations were flatly denied by
(H. 37-46).

When defense counsel revealed such

intentions, the court responded:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"It really doesn't matter what your
theory is, if your evidence with respect
to credibility is not legally admissible.
I don't think we ouaht to go into it. I
don't think the testimony of immoral acts,
or whether or not a crime has been committed•
and not prosecuted is admissible, other
than general reputation in a community
for truth and veracity. I don't think
you can go into a person's reputation
on the questions of credibility, and to
show that she has worked at one time
as a prostitute or if she took drugs
of something of that nature." (H. 10)
Throughout the hearing and trial, the court
exercised proper judicial discretion in limiting defense
counsel's questions to the facts and issues to be decided
and blocked peripheral expeditions.

Defense counsel had

complete freedom to challenge Miss Stout's "character
for truth, honesty, or integrity" with proper evidence
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1953).)

The court's rulings

merely limited counsel's use of improper evidence and
testimony.

Respondent submits that the court was

extremely cooperative and liberal in allowing a great
deal of collateral testimony to be given.

It even

allowed the defense to present testimony to be given.

It

even allowed the defense to present testimony concerning
Miss Stout which was highly embarrassing to her (T.97-98).
It is the law that the extent of cross-examination
is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972).
The court correctly ruled concerning defendant's attempts
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to show Miss Stout's alleged use of narcotics.

Evidence

of narcotics use is not admissible on the ground that it
is relevant to witness credibility.
(Cal. App.) 11 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1961).

People v. Enriquez,
It is the positive

duty of the trial judge to supervise conduct of a trial
so that examination of witnesses is kept within reasonable
bounds of relevance; the scope and extent of collateral
issues for purposes of impeachment rests largely in the
trial court's discretion.
516 P.2d 159 (1973).

State v. Belote, 213 Kan. 291,

In Belote, supra, when defense

counsel tried to show that the undercover aaent's prior
conviction of drug offenses impaired the credibility of
the witness, the court excluded such questions.

The

Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the action and stated:
"Drug offenses per se do not involve
dishonesty or false statements in their
commission; thus, convictions for such
offenses are inadmissible for purposes
of impairing credibility of witness."
In summary, it is essential that this court
find a "clear abuse of discretion" in order to reverse
defendant's conviction.

Respondent has shown that the

exercise of the trial judge's discretion was within
statutory bounds and that there has been no clear proof
of abuse of that discretion.

Therefore, the conviction

ought to be affirmed.
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POINT II
• ASSUMING TRIAL COURT!S LIMITATION OF DEFENSE
QUESTIONING CONSTITUTED ERROR, IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL
TO ANY SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT.
The Utah Code Ann. § 77-4 2-1 (19 53), states:
"After hearing an appeal the court .
must give judgment without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.
If error has been committed, it
should not be presumed to have resulted
in prejudice. The court must be satisfied that it has that effect before
it is warranted in reversing the
judgment."
The purpose of a trial is to see that justice
is done.

The trial court rulings concerning testimony

and evidence about a witness1 alleged improprieties were
merely collateral to the main issue, which was the guilt
or innocence of the defendant Patry Curtis.

As to meeting

standards of protection for his rights, the court did an
admirable job.

His conviction should not be reversed

upon the inconsequential grounds presented by appellant.
As this court said in State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 126127, 262 P.2d 756 (1953):
"We are also conscious of the facts
that a trial in the courts of this state
is a proceeding in the interest of justice
to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused and not just a game. We
will not reverse Criminal causes for
mere error or irregularity. It is only
when there has been error which is
both substantial and prejudicial to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the rights of the accused that a
reversal, is warranted."
Assuming the trial court's ruling constituted
error, such error was harmless and a reading of the trial
transcript will quickly show that further extraneous
allegations by defense counsel would have made no difference.
See also, Champman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,
17 L.Ed. 705 (1967).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ACQUIT THE
DEFENDANT ON THE GROUNDS OF ENTRAPMENT.
Appellant contends that his criminal conviction
for distributing amphetamine, under the Controlled
Substances Act, ought to be reversed; that he was illegally
entrapped by a police officer into committing the crime.
The Utah Supreme Court firmly established the
standard for entrapment in State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d
148, 369 P.2d 494 (1962).

Justice Crockett stated:

". . . if defendants attitude
of mind was such that he desired and
intended to commit the crime, the mere
fact that an officer or someone else
afforded him the opportunity to commit
it would not constitute entrapment which
would be a defense to its commission;
and this would not be less true even
though an undercover man went alona
with the defendant in the criminal plan
and aided or encouraged him in it."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (Supp. 1973)
reflects this sound position.
"Entrapment occurs when a law
enforcement officer or a person
directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order
to obtain evidence of the commission
for prosecution by methods creating
a substantial risk that the offense
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct
merely affordinq a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not •
constitute entrapment."
Entrapment is an affirmative defense and one
that defendant must prove.

State v. Good, 110 Ohio App.

415, 165 N.E.2d 28 (1960).

While appellant has made

many allegations, it has yet to prove that entrapment
actually occurred.

Mere inferences and generalizations

do not rise to meet the need.

Defendant has failed to

show that the facts surrounding the illegal transaction
of June 18, 1974, constituted entrapment.

The trial

court was aware of this and remarked, upon concluding
the entrapment hearing:
"I have got to decide this question
based upon whether or not, I can say, as
a matter of law, that there was entrapment
in this case. And without even knowing
any of the evidence relating to these
transactions, I don't see how I can
possibly approach them."
(H. 112-113)
Appellant contends that defendant Curtis was
not predisposed to commit the offense, and that he was
by the Howard W.
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU.
induced Digitized
by illegal
police
conduct.
The
statute
provides
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the entrapment defense for those who were "not otherwise
ready to commit [the offense].11

In other words, the

defendant must have been an "innocent person/' State v.
Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 241, 432 P.2d 50 (1967), "normally
law abiding," State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (1974),
who

had a "natural reluctance to commit crime to which

he had no predisposition."
513 P.2d 438 (1973).

State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 77,

While evidence of the defendant's

prior criminal activity was inadmissible, except his own
admission of a felony record, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(6),
it is clear that from a "totality of the circumstances" the
trier of fact can find a predisposition toward commission
of crime.

United States v. Rodriguez, 433 F.2d 760

(1st Cir. 1970).

It is clear, from a totality of the cir-

cumstances, that defendant Curtis was predisposed to distribution of controlled substances.
that

His testimony showed

he thrived in the criminal community

(TV 60).

of Provo

He testified that he provided hundreds of

amphetamines to Rose Ann Stout (T.59), and that he received
them from narcotics suppliers.

He knew the prices of

narcotics and whether or not they were available (H. 34).
Mrs. Stout testified that at their first meeting the
defendant offered to supply her with amphetamines (H.39).
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On the day preceding the violation, June 17,
it was the defendant who came to Miss Stout's home and
offered again to supply her with "speed" (T. 8 ) . She
persuaded him to wait until later in the eveninq, by
which time the Drug Task Force could have mobilized.
Defendant Curtis also telephone Miss Stout at the Country
Club, where she worked, that same day concerning the
sale that evening (T. 9-10).
Besides these overt signs of being a ready and
willing supplier, Curtis ^knowingly committed the crime."
People v. Nordeste, 125 C.A.2d 462, 270 P.2d 530 (1954);
thus there is much that can also be deduced logically
concerning defendant's predisposition.

He moved easily

among drug circles and knew their activities.

He had

no visible means of support, but testified concerning
that "oil leases" in Vernal, Utah, were his source of
income (T.66).

It is evident that Curtis was not

"an innocent person" who would not otherwise be engaging
in criminal conduct. . ."

State v. Cowan, 26.Utah 2d

410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971).
The defense made allegations during the trial
concerning "sexual inducements" by Rose Ann Stout, attempting to show that but for this inducement, Curtis would
not have sold narcotics to her.

Respondent continues to

deny such relationship occurred, but assuming it did,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

was such action improper?
First,
appellant fails to
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

cite case law supporting that position!

There are many

cases where the courts have found "emotional inducements"
entirely within the law.

For example, preying on the

sympathies of a supplier by pretending drug addiction or
even friendship, are tolerable inducements.

Locklayer v.

State, 317 N.E.2d 863 (Ind. App. 1974), United States v.
Test, 486 F.2d 922 (10th Cir. 1973).
Second, the dates involved show that even if
such a relationship did exist, the more than two months
without any contact at all between Miss Stout and defendant Curtis shows the inconsistency of the sexual inducement argument.

The trial court found this a deciding

factor in his decision for conviction (T. 112-113), thinking it too incredible for belief that two months after
the illicit relationship terminated, that the only inducement for defendant's illegal sale of narcotics was Miss
Stout's sexual favors.
This court recently spoke to this issue in
State v. Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 421, 432 P.2d 50 (1967):
"The amount of persuasion should
not be of importance when it is used
upon one who is in readiness to commit
the crime in question. That persuasion
which induces the criminally inclined
to lose his wariness is not entrapment
at all. . ."
What we have is a forty-seven year old man who
knew what the law prohibited, understood what he was doing,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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when he voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally broke
it selling five hundred amphetamines for $100 to Rose Ann
Stout, an undercover agent.

The conviction should stand.

POINT IV
THE DEFENSE OF PROCURING AGENT IS UNTIMELY ON
APPEAL; BUT EVEN ASSUMING THAT IT IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE
COURT, THE EVIDENCE AND FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT SUCH A
DEFENSE.
Defendant Curtis was convicted under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8 (1953), which provides:
11

. . .it shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly and intentionally:
to distribute for value a controlled
or counterfeit substance."
(a)(ii).
(Emphasis added.)
The brief submitted by appellant stretches in a
Procrustean length the definition of "value" as used
in the statute above.

Nowhere is "value defined as

"profit or gain resulting from the transaction."
(Appellant Brief, p. 10). To justify such an extreme interpretation it would not be unreasonable to expect applicable
case law on point, especially since "most statutes" of
most states are worded thusly. Id., at 10.
A proper interpretation of this key word may
be found in Webster1s New International Dictionary, 19 38
2d Ed.
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"Value: a fair return in money,
goods, services, etc., for something
exchanged; that which is considered
an equivalent in worth; as, to get
the value of one's money in a purchase."
The statute reads "distribute for value" not
"sell at a profit or gain."

The facts show that Curtis

did distribute for value, (emphasis added) that is, he
exchanged narcotis for something of equivalent worth,
$100.

Even assuming a profit or gain must result,

.

appellant has failed to show that such a return did not
occur.
In the lower court, the defense also failed
to present the issue of "agency" or the procuring agent
defense.

Furthermore, no contention as to this point was

made in defendant's Motion to Reverse and Vacate Judgment
or For New Trial.

In fact, defense counsel therein

admitted the logical possibility of a profit on the
transaction, the antithesis of the agency defense.

Since

it was not an issue below, it is not properly one now.

A

question not presented at trial, not argued, and not
set forth in motion for new trial or petition in error
does not deserve consideration on appeal.
341 P.2d 616 (Okla. Cr. 1959).

Jones v. State,

In State v. Starlight Club,

17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965), where defendants incurred
a fine and revocation of their nonprofit corporate charter
for illegally selling liquor, certain constitutional arguments were raised for the first time on appeal.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

Supreme Court said:

"This was raised the first time on

appeal and we are not constrained to canvass it."

See,

also, Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 465 P.2d 343
(1970),

State v. Little, 19 Utah 2d 53, 426 P.2d 4 (1967).

Therefore, respondent contends that the issue is not properly before this court.
Even if we assume that the issue of agency or
"innocent go-between" is properly submitted on appeal,
a cursory examination of applicable case law will quickly
demonstrate that defendant Curtis was not acting in the
procuring agent capacity, as defined by the courts.
Appellant relies on several cases which he
describes as fundamental to this defense.

In Durham v.

State, 280 S.W. 2d 737 (Tex. Crim. 1955), the defendant, a
woman, claimed she was acting in cooperation with the police
whom she knew to be such, received $6 in advance from the
agent, went to an identified supplier and bought the police
agent one capsule of heroin.
the substance.

She was convicted of "selling"

But she was able to show that there was

no benefit to herself, and no sale or transaction with the
agent.

Her conviction was reversed.
The facts in State v. Smith, 396 S.W.2d 876

(Tex. Cr. 1965) , were substantially the same.

The defendant
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purchased narcotics from a known supplier for a "revealed"
police agent who had told the defendant he wanted to make
a case against the supplier.

In Roy v. State/ 87 Nev. 517,.

489 P.2d 1158 (1971), also cited by appellant, the Supreme
Court of Nevada unanimously reversed the conviction of a
twenty-two year old mentally retarded bus boy who had
purchased a "lid" of marijuana at the request of a friendly
police agent.

The Court found that appellant was acting

solely for recipient, not "selling" anything.
State,

Posey v.

507 P.2d 576 (Okla. Cr. 1973), is also cited

by appellant as controlling.

This case, however, involved

codefendants who were given $20 by a police agent and told
not to buy hashish for more than $15.

The two men entered

a nearby resident, were gone for five or ten minutes,
then returned to the officerfs car.

Posey handed the offi-

cer an aluminum foil wrapper, Mayes handed him a $5 bill
and told him they had gotten the price down to $15.

Posey's

conviction for "selling" was reversed.
Finally, appellants cited United States v. Moses,
220 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1955), as the "rule simply stated."
Simply stated, the facts of the case at bar do not, by
any stretch of the imagination, resemble the Moses case.
Marie Moses, a young drug addicted woman of twenty-six,
referred federal undercover agents to a seller, introduced
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them, and vouched for them.

There was no showing that she

either collaborated with the seller, or received anything
from the buyers, yet she was convicted of selling narcotics.
There can be no doubt that she was wrongly convicted and
justly acquitted.
From the events surrounding the sale to Rose
Ann Stout of five hundred amphetamine "whites" by defendant
Curtis for $100, the elements of the procuring agent defense,
as brought out above, cannot be found.
First, there was an actual sale, an exchange
for value, by Mr. Curtis. Miss Stout paid for the pills
at the exchange and had not entrusted the defendant with
the money earlier.
Second, there is no

identified seller or

supplier other than the defendant.

He has failed to estab-

lish himself as a "go-between."
Third, appellant has not shown that no profit
or gain resulted form the sale.
Fourth, Curtis never alleged that he suspected
Miss Stout was an undercover agent, or knew her to be one.
His only defense is that she repeatedly asked him for pills,
two months before the transaction.
is true, it is no defense.

Even if we.assume this

In State v. Akin, 75 N.M. 308,

404 P.2d 134 (1965), a police agent's persistent inquiries
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as to whether defendant had marijuana and his constant
suggestions that he was in the market showed no more
offers of opportunity to commit the crime, and were held
valid.
Finally, what we have seen in each "procuring
agent" case above is something akin to the description
provided in Justice Henroid's persuasive dissent in State
v. Schultz, 27 Utah 2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (1972), as to
the difference between the defendant's status as a seller
or distributor of narcotics and the "go-between agent."
Judge for yourselves whether or not the defendant Patry
Curtis, who knowingly and intentionally violated the
law can be described as "a nutty go-between" intending
no offense save that of being altruistically stupid."

We

think not, and submit that the conviction must stand.
CONCLUSION •

1

Based upon the above arguments of facts and
law, respondent respectfully urcres that the lower court
be affirmed.

|.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General

|
|

WILLIAM W. BARRETT
j
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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